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The paper examines the use of the modal verb SHALL in the if clauses of conditionals 
found in legal English. The study traces the history of such usages and compares them to 
two uses of WILL attested in the same grammatical environment: a temporal use and a 
nonepistemic modal use. The comparison provides the foundation for examining the use 
of SHALL in Biblical translations, where this verb has outlived its demise in general 
English, and both of these sources inform the analysis of SHALL in legal conditionals. 
Specifically, it is claimed that SHALL is not inherently deontic in legal English but is 
used as an explicit marker of the authority vested in the author or authors of spoken and 
written texts. This approach explains why authority conscious drafters can use SHALL in 
the if clauses of conditionals and in temporal clauses whenever they want to and why the 
proponents of the plain language movement advocate simply deleting SHALL from legal 
writing and not replacing it with more popular modals expressing deontic meanings, e.g. 
HAVE TO, MUST, etc.  It is claimed that no such replacements are recommended 
because there is no deontic meaning to replace and the authority designated by SHALL 
can be inferred from the context. 
 





The drafters of English legal documents are well known for their fond attachment to the 
modal verb SHALL. It has been noted in a number of studies that its use in legal texts is 
substantially more frequent than elsewhere in English (e.g. Williams 2007, Witczak–
Plisiecka 2009, Goźdź–Roszkowski forthcoming) and resilient enough to withstand so 
far the zealous calls to weed it out repeatedly made by the supporters of simplifying 
legal writing (e.g. Kimble 2000). 
Given the contrast between the survival of SHALL in drafting contracts and 
legislation (Goźdź–Roszkowski forthcoming) and its almost complete disappearance 
from other kinds of written and spoken texts during the previous century (Leech et al 
(2009), it is no wonder that it has attracted quite much research. Based on extensive 
corpora scholars have studied the development of SHALL as a modal verb and future 
marker, e.g.: van Ostade (1985), Arnovick (1990), Gotti et al (2002) or Wischer (2006), 
its current standing in English, e.g.: Gotti (2003), Bergs (2008) or Leech et al (2009), the 
rise of SHALL in legal English, e.g.: Rissanen (2000) and its present use in legal 
drafting, e.g.: Klinge (1995) or Trosborg (1995), Conte and Di Lucia (2009) or Witczak–
Plisiecka (2009). 
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However, all these studies have mostly stayed away from examining in any detail the use 
of SHALL in if clauses and an assortment of temporal clauses occasionally found in 
legal documents. Both atypical patterns are illustrated below by two recent examples: an 
excerpt from the terms and conditions of ordering medical equipment posted online in 
2010 by Genetix Ltd., an English company headquartered in New Milton, Hampshire (1) 
and a clause found in an order issued by North Dakota Securities Department in 2008 
(2): 
 
(1)  2.6 If the Company shall cease to manufacture any Goods ordered by the 
Customer it shall give notice of the fact in writing to the Customer (but shall 
not be liable for any loss or damage occasioned thereby to the Customer) 
whereupon the Customer will have the option to be exercised within twenty-
one days of the date of such notice, either to take equivalent goods (if 
available from the Company) or to cancel its order without further liability 
upon the Company or the Customer. 
 
(2)  Pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 10-04-16, when it shall appear to the Commissioner 
that any person has engaged in, or is engaging in, or is about to engage in an 
act or practice which is declared illegal in this chapter, the commissioner 
may issue an order and collect civil penalties against any person found in an 
administrative action to have violated any provision of the chapter in an 
amount not to exceed $10,000 for each violation. 
 
The usages underlined above are relatively infrequent even in legal drafting and could be 
easily dismissed as antiquities to be swept away by the plain language movement but the 
insights into the role of SHALL in legal English offered by the curious grammar of such 
cases certainly make them worth exploring. This paper will do so by surveying scant 
previous scholarship on such uses of SHALL in section 2, tracing their origin in section 
3, examining their relationship to comparable uses of WILL in section 4, offering an 
explanation in section 5 and pursuing its wider ramifications in section 6. 
 
 
2. Previous scholarship 
 
Recent corpus studies of SHALL in legal English dutifully note only the existence of the 
pattern illustrated in (1) but the authors do not venture too far beyond stating that fact. 
For example Trosborg (1995) quotes an example with SHALL in the if clause repeated 
here as (3) below: 
 
(3) The licence to reside in the premises [...] shall terminate automatically without any 
notice if the officer shall cease to reside in the premises or upon termination of 
this agreement. 
 
and comments on it as follows: 
 
Only the structure with shall in italics functions as a directive; the second shall (in 
the subordinate clause) is used as a condition on the illocution signalled in the main 
clause. (Trosborg 1995: 40) 
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In other words she merely notes the fairly obvious point that the use of SHALL in if 
clauses does not serve to impose obligation on the addressee and goes on to examine 
other facets of legal English. Doing so does not explain much but passing over the 
problem in silence turns out to be benevolently neutral when compared with the opinions 
other scholars. 
Discussing an essentially similar example Klinge (1995) is more radical both in 
admitting defeat in dealing with the problem and dismissing its importance: 
 
Although it may not be an entirely satisfactory solution, the explanation is most 
likely that such data are the results of draftsmen’s penchant for shall rather than 
semantics or systematic usage. In this context shall makes little sense both in this 
framework and in traditional frameworks. (Klinge 1995: 670) 
 
In the final sentence of the comment Klinge admits that accounting for the use of 
SHALL in if clauses and a host of other subordinate clauses is well beyond the reach of 
extant approaches, whether they are built on the concept of deontic modality (e.g. 
Trosborg’s model) or broader theories of discourse operators (e.g. Klinge’s model). 
However, in the preceding sentence he tries to load the blame for the shortcomings of his 
model on the data he set out to explain by questioning their reliability and consistence. 
The same dismissive attitude is voiced in Williams (2007), who likewise views the 
use of SHALL in if clauses as a harmless relic of the past that need not be bothered with 
or accounted for: 
 
In such cases shall would seem to have no modal function whatsoever; it is purely 
ornamental, [...] a legacy from the past which many contemporary drafters still 
adopt on the basis of a centuries-old tradition rather than for reasons of clarity. 
(Williams 2007: 120) 
 
The temporal pattern illustrated in (2) is not even mentioned in studies devoted to the use 
of SHALL in legal English, which sadly underscores the point that previous scholarship 
has thus focused much more on evading the patterns exemplified above than on positing 
even the most tentative explanations. As will be shown in section 6 below this sad state 




3. Historical background 
 
A brief look into the history of using SHALL in legal English if clauses is a more 
positive experience than reviewing the evasive comments surveyed above and exposes 
facts that eventually help uncover the rationale behind this curious grammatical pattern. 
Both uses of SHALL illustrated above arose in early Middle English times as an 
alternative to if and temporal clauses formulated in the present tense and the subjunctive 
and they continued well into the eighteenth century. The last example noted in Visser 
(1963) comes from the writings of Coleridge, which means that the patterns finally 
disappeared from general English in the first half of the nineteenth century. However, in 
legal discourse the story is a bit different. 
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The earliest example of legal usage dates from 1533, i.e. from the time when the use of 
SHALL in legal writing started mushrooming (Rissanan 2000: 114), and is found in the 
Appointment of Bishops Act, a piece of legislation that was instrumental in establishing 
the Church of England and remains in force until now: 
 
(4)  And yf any such nomynacion or presentment shall happen to be made for 
defaute of suche eleccion to the dignytie or office of any Archebishope then 
the Kynges Highnes his heires and successours, by hys letters patentes under 
hys greate seale, shall nomynate and present such person, as they wyll dispose 
to have the seid office and dignitie of Archebishopriche beyng voyde. 
 
A century later the continuing use of the pattern is evidenced by An Ordinance for the 
better observation of the Lords – Day passed by the Long Parliament in 1644: 
 
(5)  And it is further Ordained, That if any of the said Officers shall neglect to do 
their Office in the Premises, within one week after the notice of this Ordinance, 
every of them, for such neglect shall forfeit Five Shillings of lawful Moneys; 
and so from week to week, weekly Five shillings more afterwards, till the said 
May-Pole shall be taken down, and removed. 
 
The usage did not change much in the following century as shown by an excerpt from 
article 1 section 7 of the Constitution of the United States of America adopted in 1787: 
 
(6)  Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the 
United States; [...] If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten 
days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same 
shall be a law. 
 
The pattern remained also in use more than a century later as evidenced by the following 
passage in the regulations governing the Balfour Studentship in Zoology drafted in 1904 
and kept on the books of Cambridge University until now: 
 
(7)  If the Managers shall at any time learn that the Student is following any such 
business or profession, or has undertaken any such work, as would in their 
opinion interfere with the Student's inquiries, they shall at once call upon him 
or her to desist from the same, and if the Student shall refuse or neglect so to 
do they shall report the circumstances to the Board. 
 
Finally, the pattern continues to be used nowadays as has already been shown in section 
1 above and is witnessed again below by a provision culled from the general conditions 
of contracting services with the company operating Liverpool John Lennon Airport 
posted online in 2010: 
 
(8)  if the Company shall have a winding up order or administration order made 
against it or it shall enter into or become subject to a scheme, composition or 
voluntary arrangement with his creditors or there shall be commenced a 
winding-up dissolution administrative receivership or analogous proceedings 
of or in respect of the Company or any of the Company's assets then, without 
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prejudice to any other remedy of the Group, it shall be lawful, without 
avoiding the Order, to take the work wholly or partially out of the hands of the 
Company and to employ another company to purchase the Goods or similar 
items or to carry out or complete the Services 
 
While it is correct that the use of SHALL in legal English if clauses is quite an old 
pattern, as implied in the evasive comments in Klinge (1995) and Williams (2007), it is 
thus not true, as intimated by the same authors, that it is unsystematic and / or defunct. 
As shown above, it has continued in the same form for five centuries and has outlived 
the demise of the pattern in general English at least by a century and a half. 
The fact that SHALL has not disappeared completely from if clauses and lingers on 
in legal usage is not in itself remarkable in any way as most language changes are 
incomplete and leave in their wake a residue of unaffected items or contexts that are then 
labeled exceptions and irregularities. What is striking, though, is that the change failed to 
affect the people who spend long years honing their language skills to perfection and 
enjoy high social status. Becoming a lawyer has always required completing several 
levels of formal education exposing students to grammar books and teachers whose 
combined pressure was usually quite effective as witnessed, for example, by the 
replacement of multiple negation with single negation in the language of educated 
speakers. Besides single negation lawyers have accepted the rise of perfect and 
progressive verb forms, the demise of the subjunctive in if clauses and several other 
grammar changes promoted by textbooks and the rejection of each of these 
developments could have become a hallmark of legal English. However, only the 
pressure to drop SHALL was stubbornly resisted on a large scale, which shows that the 
motivation to do so must have been much stronger than a mere penchant for grammatical 
relics. For instance lawyers may have continued to use SHALL in if and temporal 
clauses after its demise in general English because that verb designates a meaning that 
remains vital in law but has lost its significance elsewhere in society. 
 
 
4. Comparison with WILL 
 
Another modal verb that is found in if and temporal clauses is WILL. Given the fact that 
the case of WILL has been researched more fruitfully and is now better understood, it 
might be worthwhile to check if the accounts worked out for that modal verb could be 
extended to SHALL. 
One meaning found to be profiled by WILL in if clauses is essentially temporal, e.g.: 
 
 (9) If it will amuse you, I’ll tell you a joke. 
 
The students of such atypical patterns, e.g. Comrie (1982), where this example comes 
from, or Declerck (1984) agree that the use of WILL illustrated in (9) is linked to the 
ordering of the events profiled by the two clauses of the conditional. The standard 
scenario is that the if clause designates and event which precedes the situation profiled 
by the result clause in the same fashion as causes precede their consequences. However, 
in cases like (9) this ordering is reversed in that the result clause profiles joke telling, i.e. 
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the event that normally comes first, and the if clause designates amusement, i.e. the state 
that results from entertainment and occurs later. 
Instead of stipulating a condition the if clause in (9) designates thus a future 
prediction, which requires the use of WILL. In other words WILL is dispensed with in 
the standard case when the if clause profiles a condition but it is indispensable in the 
nonstandard scenario described and illustrated above. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to extrapolate this account to cases where the modal 
verb used in the if clause is SHALL, e.g. the following excerpt of an act adopted by New 
Jersey legislature in 2009: 
 
(10) If the director shall, in accordance with subsection a of this section, reduce the 
rate of tax imposed pursuant to PL 1966, c.30 to a rate of less than 3.5% during 
a tax reduction period, the Director shall immediately notify the State 
Treasurer of the rate and the terms and conditions for which tax shall be 
imposed during that tax reduction period and shall immediately submit a report 
to the Legislature, pursuant to section 2 of P.L. 1991, c. 164 (C.52:14-19.1) 
outlining the rate and the terms and conditions for which tax shall be imposed 
during that tax reduction period. 
 
The reduction of the tax rate profiled in the if clause underlined above is a true condition 
profiling an event that has to precede each of the actions designated in the result clauses, 
i.e. notifying the state treasurer and filing a report with the state legislature. The order of 
the events profiled in (10) does not then follow the pattern that conditions the use of 
WILL in the if clause in (9), which means that the rationale for using SHALL in the if 
clause in (10) has to be looked for elsewhere. 
The second use of WILL in if clauses is, however, more promising. As is well known 
WILL can designate in such clauses a variety of nonepistemic meanings illustrated 
below with examples quoted after Decleck and Reed (2001: 210–212): 
 
(11)  If your mother will cooperate, you might ask her these kinds of questions. 
 
(12) Let’s check in the brochure. If the boat will sleep eight people, none of us will 
have to go to a hotel. 
 
(13) If Freedom Fighters will not give in – Quo Vadis, John Major ? 
 
In (11) the use of WILL designates willingness on the part of the mother, i.e. a person 
who is not the addressee or, as lawyers prefer to say, a third party, in (12) WILL profiles 
an inherent capacity of the referent and in (13), along with the negation marker, it 
signifies refusal. 
Since most or all uses of SHALL are described by grammarians as nonepistemic, the 
occurrence of that verb in if clauses could then in principle be analyzed along the same 
lines as above provided that it carries a suitable meaning. 
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5. Power and authority 
 
A good place to look for such a meaning seems to be an area of language use where 
SHALL has shown the same tenacity as in law and for decades defied changes prevailing 
elsewhere in English. A case in point is the language of Bible translations. 
The strength of the resistance to give up on SHALL in that field of language use is 
aptly illustrated by the three following English versions of a well known gospel verse 
(St. Matthew 16: 26): 
 
(14)  For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own 
soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? KJ 1611 
 
(15) For what shall a man be profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and forfeit his 
life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life? ASV 1901 
 
(16) What good will it be for a man if he gains the whole world, yet forfeits his soul? 
Or what can a man give in exchange for his soul? NIV 1973 
 
The translation in (14) comes from the King James Bible first printed in 1611, i.e. at a 
time when the use of SHALL in the if clause of a conditional was not in any way 
unusual (Visser 1963). However, the translation in (15) comes from the American 
Standard Version issued in 1901, well after SHALL had disappeared from if clauses in 
virtually all varieties of English except legal drafting. What is perhaps even more telling 
is the fact the American Standard Version is in fact a revision of the King James Bible 
and one of the goals of the editors was to update its grammar. They modernized verb 
morphology, brought up to date the use of relative pronouns and introduced a number of 
other changes, but decided to leave SHALL in if clauses intact. 
As shown in (16), which comes from the New International Version released in 
1973, this usage was finally discontinued, but it held out long enough to show that 
SHALL is the carrier of a meaning that is both precious to Bible scholars and hard to 
replace. 
A good way to glimpse that meaning is to examine a biblical passage in which the 
use of SHALL continues until now, e.g. the wording of the Ten Commandments in the 
Book of Exodus 20:13–15. SHALL had already been used in the translation of that text 
well before the times of the King James Bible, e.g. the following excerpt from 
Wycliffe’s Bible completed in the final two decades of the fourteenth century 
(Ellingworth 2007): 
 
(17) 12 Onoure thi fadir and thi moder, that thou be long lyuyng on the lond, which 
thi Lord God schal yyue to thee. 13 Thou schalt not sle. 14Thou schalt do no 
letcherie. 15 Thou schalt do no theft. 
 
The usage obviously continued in the King James Bible: 
 
(18) 12Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land 
which the LORD thy God giveth thee. 13Thou shalt not kill. 14Thou shalt not 
commit adultery. 15Thou shalt not steal. 
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And was retained in the New International Version of 1973: 
 
(19) 12 “Honor your father and your mother so that you may live long in the land 
which the Lord your God is giving you. 13 “You shall not murder”. 14 “You 
shall not commit adultery”. 15 “You shall not steal”. 
 
The fact that the use of SHALL has survived so well in this passage is significant in that 
it is a most explicit example of law giving by a supreme authority equipped with the 
power to lay down biding rules and punish those who fail to follow them. God can 
certainly do both and given the correlation between His superior position with respect to 
creation and the use of SHALL in the translation of those scriptural passages where His 
dominion is directly exercised in formulating the commandments, SHALL may be 
claimed to be a grammatical marker of the supreme status of the speaker. 
As shown in all three versions of verse 12 above, commandments might just as well 
be formulated in the imperative and without any recourse to SHALL, leaving the 
dominating position of the speaker to be inferred from the context. The use of SHALL in 
the meaning stipulated above is thus optional. However, if the writer chooses to indicate 
explicitly that the rules are warranted by a superior authority, SHALL becomes 
indispensable as in the three remaining verses. 
Since authority may be exercised not only orally (cf. the use of inverted commas in 
(19) to underscore the directness of the experience) but also in writing, e.g. by signing 
legal or financial instruments, and superiority is manifest not only in laying down the 
rules or enacting laws but also in enforcing them by persons and institutions duly 
empowered to do so, the meaning identified above to be carried by SHALL can be 
restated in somewhat more general terms. Specifically it is claimed that SHALL is 
construed as a marker of authority vested in the author or authors of spoken and written 
texts. 
Given this perspective on SHALL accounting for its usage in if clauses is not a 
problem any more, e.g. the following provision of the by-laws of the International Rugby 
Board, the organization governing the sport of rugby union: 
 
(20) If the Chairman shall cease in office then the Vice – Chairman elected pursuant to 
Bye – Law 9.7(a) shall assume the position of Chairman pro – tem and the 
Council shall elect a new Chairman and Vice Chairman at its next meeting. 
 
The underlined clause specifies the case when the vice-chairman steps into the shoes of 
the chairman and the use of SHALL merely explicates that the council that drafted and 
adopted this provision was duly authorized to do so. 
The provision obviously might just as well have been formulated without resorting to 
SHALL and, for example, worded as follows: 
 
(20´) If the Chairman ceases in office then the Vice – Chairman elected pursuant to 
Bye – Law 9.7(a) shall assume the position of Chairman pro – tem and the 
Council shall elect a new Chairman and Vice Chairman at its next meeting. 
 
The change would not have in any way affected the validity of the provision or the 
manner of its application. However, the fact that it was promulgated by an institution 
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empowered to lay down rules and enforce them would then have to be inferred from a 
variety of contextual cues, e.g. the title of the document, its preamble, previous clauses, 
etc., while the use of SHALL in (20) makes that point explicit. 
The same is the case with the use of SHALL in temporal clauses attested in legal 
English but left out of its descriptions surveyed in section 2 above, e.g. the following 
clause from the terms and conditions of sale posted online in 2010 by Company Select 
(UK) Limited, based in Telford, Shropshire : 
 
(21) No order once placed may be cancelled by the Customer who will accept delivery 
of the goods or supply of the services from Company Select (UK) Limited 
when the Company shall so require. 
 
Formulating the underlined clause without any recourse to SHALL again would not have 
caused any damage to the effectiveness of the provision, but only using that verb 




6. Wider ramifications 
 
The account developed in the preceding sections sheds light a number of further issues 
discussed below. The most immediate one is identifying the reason why previous 
accounts of SHALL use in legal English have shied away from discussing its occurrence 
in temporal and conditional clauses. 
The problem seems to have been rooted in assuming that SHALL has a principally 
deontic meaning (Witczak-Plisiecka 2009) and using it in a text is tantamount to 
imposing an obligation on the addresses (Trosborg 1995) or warranting that the text is a 
true representation of reality to the extent the situation is under the control of an 
intentional agent (Klinge 1995). However, as has been shown above, this approach is too 
narrow. Building on such an assumption makes it possible to account for SHALL uses in 
most main clauses, but rules out doing so in conditional and temporal clauses where no 
guarantees are offered or obligations imposed. 
Secondly, the approach pursued above offers a straightforward explanation of the 
reason why the practitioners of simplifying legal English usually do not replace SHALL 
with other modal verbs but prefer to remove it and rephrase all affected clauses in the 
simple present (Williams 2007). If SHALL really profiled the imposition of an 
obligation, replacing it with MUST, HAVE TO, etc. would certainly make much more 
sense. However, as shown above, SHALL in fact designates that the author of a text is 
vested with sufficient authority to formulate it, which does not come anywhere close to 
the meaning of any other English modal verb but fortunately can be easily deduced from 
the context. 
The efforts to eradicate SHALL from legal writing are thus ultimately based on the 
unspoken assumption that it is irreplaceable but removable, and, paradoxically, provide 
support for an account of its use. 
Finally, the account of SHALL worked out above to explain its uses in conditional 
and temporal clauses can be extended to all types of clauses and legal documents. In 
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instruments enacted by legislatures, assented to by monarchs, signed into law by 
presidents, approved by general meetings and issued by courts or administrative agencies 
the superiority of their real or imputed authors over the addressees is unquestionable. 
Citizens, subjects, company employees and parties to disputes are bound by the 
decisions written down in statutes, resolutions, charters, by – laws, judgments, orders, 
warrants, etc., which makes any such documents susceptible to the use of SHALL for 
reasons matching its description in section 5. 
In the case of deeds and contracts the situation is somewhat more egalitarian in that 
the parties to such instruments agree to create obligations for one another and promise to 
fulfill them (Black et al. 1983). Each party is thus both bound to perform the duties it 
owes to the counterparties and is empowered to exercise the rights the counterparties 
agreed to vest in it. Since all parties to a contract serve in both roles they are ultimately 
equal but that condition stems from the fact that they are each other’s superiors. 
Consequently, the provisions of deeds and contracts also are susceptible to the use of 
SHALL for reasons that match its description in section 5. 
Analyzing SHALL in terms of a marker of the authority vested in the author of a text 
corroborates thus the thetic account outlined in Conte and Di Lucia (2009) and makes it 
possible to account both for legal English usages which can be satisfactorily explicated 
in other frameworks and for those cases where other explanations fail, e.g. conditional 
and temporal clauses. As shown in the preceding sections, this account is also applicable 
to other fields of language use in which SHALL has outlived the pressure to phase it out, 
e.g. Bible translation, and is analogous to a well known and documented use of WILL. 
And last but not least, it explains why legal documents or religious texts may be fraught 
with SHALL, merely peppered with it here and there or devoid of it altogether without 
any impact on their validity as the meaning explicitly designated by that verb can be 
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